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In this paper I propose to do three things: to identify the very different implications of the 
different stages of the mining and the oil and gas sequence, to discuss the basics of the Crown 
Minerals Act and associated legislation, with particular reference to Māori interests, and to 
touch on a few points of comparison with Canada. 
 
 
The Sequence of Operations in Mining and in Oil and Gas  
 
There is an enormous diversity in the minerals industry and in the oil and gas industry. A 
mineral exploration company may be targeting particular metallic minerals, industrial 
minerals, construction materials, or coal. While we might think of something like gold as our 
target, there are important niches for more mundane substances like bentonite or gypsum. If 
something is found, then there are different kinds of mine that may be built; open pit or 
underground? Solution mining? A small alluvial gold operation may need a backhoe and a 
trommel and little more. In the oil and gas industry, targets are less diverse, but (for example) 
a shale gas play will require much more surface and subsurface activity than a light free-
lowing oil field.  
 
Geology is hugely important. It dictates where the targets are to be found, and how they can 
be developed. One of the implications is that a company has only limited control over its 
location; and land use planners cannot readily say in advance what lands should be allocated 
to mineral production.  
 
It is useful to understand the sequence of mineral development.1 For hard rock minerals (not 
oil or gas) the sequence starts with strategy, where companies decide what type of target and 
geology they are good at. Reconnaissance is next, perhaps as desk work using the existing 
knowledge of an area. Wide-scale methods of exploration may follow, such as aerial 
geophysical surveying. From this work specific anomalies may be detected that merit closer 
investigation, by ground geology, geochemical sampling, and ground-based geophysical 
work. At some point most targets call for exploration by diamond drilling, to extract rock 
samples from bores that may be a couple of hundred meters deep. (Diamond drilling is 
therefore very different from oil and gas drilling.) Drilling intensifies and bulk samples may 
be taken. A company usually obtains a feasibility study that determines exactly what kind of 
mine can be developed, taking into account geology, metallurgy, environment, access, market, 
financial and social factors. If it is followed by a production decision then mine construction 
                                                          
1 There is a useful graphic on this point, and much more, in K Ruckstuhl et al, Māori and Mining (Māori and 
Mining Research Team, University of Otago, 2013), p 38.  
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or development proceeds, followed eventually by production. Rehabilitation will accompany 
production and continue after it ends. In the oil and gas sector, exploration relies more on 
geophysical techniques. They may be followed by the drilling of an exploratory well that is a 
much more expensive proposition than a diamond drilling programme. On the other hand, a 
petroleum exploration well can be put into production relatively quickly if oil is discovered. A 
gas project depends on pipelines and markets, so is more complicated.  
 
This sequence of development is variable and by no means universal. For example, coal and 
dimension stone (eg marble) require little expenditure on exploration. But understanding the 
existence of a sequence is very useful to understand the behaviour of companies and to 
understand what to watch for on behalf of communities and other affected parties. Among the 
insights that it produces are the following. 
o Exploration is very different from development or production. 
o Exploration is a process that is sometimes long drawn out. Often a company obtains 
results that may justify doing more work on the property but do not prove conclusively 
that a mine can be opened and operated profitably. The fact that some mineralization is 
found does not mean that there is enough or that it is at a sufficient concentration.  
o Exploration is risky. In both hardrock and oil and gas, many exploration programmes fail 
to find a commercial deposit, and even fewer get brought into production.  
o Banks do not lend for exploration work. Rather, companies raise funds on the stock 
exchange and through private equity investors. These investors are ready for exploration 
programmes that do not work out. They do not expect an income stream to appear. What 
attracts them is the possibility that if a project does work out then it may pay off very 
well. It is high-risk high-reward investment. 
o Exploration companies without producing assets (“juniors”) are usually much smaller than 
“majors” that have multiple producing mines or oilfields. They are strongly oriented 
towards the needs of raising capital from specialist stock exchange investors.  
o As a property progresses through the sequence, the risk and uncertainty is reduced, the 
area of interest shrinks, the environmental impact increases, the capital expenditure 
increases dramatically.  
o A mining or petroleum company must usually make all of its capital investment in 
developing a project before any income starts to flow from it. Large projects require 
colossal amounts of capital – in the tens of billions of dollars – but generally do not 
employ large numbers of people.  
o As well as the risk of not finding an economic deposit, companies also face price risks 
(commodity prices fluctuate a lot), technical risks in construction and operation, 
regulatory risks in failing to obtain permits such as environmental approvals, and (in some 
countries) political risks of delay or expropriation.  
 
These characteristics affect the impact that mining and petroleum development can have on 
the environment and the community. For example, it is not really useful to ask an early-stage 
exploration company what kind of mine it will build because it will have no idea. On the other 
hand its exploration activity is aimed at developing a producing mine if it is at all possible. 
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NZ Mining and Petroleum Law 
 
Most of the relevant New Zealand law is found in the Crown Minerals Act 1991 (CMA), 
regulations made under it, and “minerals programmes” made under it.2 The Act applies to 
petroleum and other minerals, but there are separate regulations and programmes for the two 
classes of substance. The Act was amended in 2013, with many changes of detail and 
procedure, and new programmes were issued. A great deal of other law is relevant to a 
petroleum or mining operation, especially the Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA) 
and the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 
(the EEZ Act) and the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992.  
 
Ownership 
 
The first matter to consider is ownership or underlying rights to minerals. There are several 
different classes of minerals. 
o Petroleum (ie oil and gas), gold, silver, and uranium under all lands is vested in the Crown 
by section 10 of the Act. This was contested by claimants in the Petroleum Report, but the 
Crown did not adopt the Waitangi Tribunal’s recommendation to find a Treaty interest.3  
o Pounamu in most of the the South Island is vested in Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu under the 
Ngai Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act 1997.  
o The Crown generally has rights to other minerals in or under Crown land such as national 
parks and stewardship land in the hands of the Department of Conservation. The same 
goes for submerged lands in the exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, and territorial 
sea, subject to the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011.  
o Minerals in or under private land may be owned by the land owner, by another person, or 
by the Crown. It can often be difficult to find out because the answer may depend on 
statutes like the Land Acts of the nineteenth century and on particular land transactions, 
and because of variation in the exact terms in which minerals or specific substances were 
excepted from a Crown grant or like instrument. 
o Māori land owners under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 generally hold rights to the 
minerals in their land except for the section 10 minerals. Special provisions give 
additional protection from mineral activity: certain lands protected from entry without 
consent, additional notice requirements, and protection for waahi tapu (section 51) and no 
Order in Council to force an access agreement (section 66(1)). The Maori Trustee has a 
role in some cases: section 80.  
 
Permits 
 
Much of the Crown Minerals Act is concerned with the granting of permits to give companies 
rights to Crown-owned minerals. There are prospecting, exploration and mining permits for 
the different stages of the minerals continuum (on which see below). The methods for the 
granting of permits is laid down in the minerals programmes. Exploration permits are usually 
the key entry point. In the petroleum sector, they can only be obtained in competitive 
                                                          
2 There is a good up-to-date summary of mining and petroleum law with respect to Māori in K Ruckstuhl et al, 
above n 1, pp 29-35. 
3 Waitangi Tribunal Petroleum Report (2003, WAI 796). See C Coxhead, ‘Maori Title to Petroleum: The 
Waitangi Tribunal Petroleum Report’ (2004) 7 CNZJ Yearbook 66. 
4 
 
Petroleum Exploration Permit Rounds, which are held annually.4 The Minister through New 
Zealand Petroleum and Minerals (NZPAM) decides which areas or blocks to include in a 
round, and companies put in tenders or bids, usually bids for a staged work programme. The 
government looks for bids that will commit to the most active work programme. The 
underlying policy is one of maximizing exploration activity and knowledge of the publicly-
owned resource. It is also a policy of “use it or lose it;” if a permit holder does not carry out 
the promised work then the permit is cancelled. If a company with a PEP makes a discovery, 
it usually upgrades to a Petroleum Mining Permit under section 36 of the Act, which gives the 
company a strong assurance that it will be able to do so. For minerals other than petroleum, 
exploration permits are more usually awarded by “acceptable work programme offer” which 
is in effect first-in-first-served.5 This is more suited to the variegated nature of non-petroleum 
mineral resources. However NZPAM is also trying out competitive tendering in the sector.  
 
The minerals programmes try to make the application procedures clear and straightforward, 
but companies sometimes complain that it is a long and frustrating experience. Companies 
also complain about the expense of making applications and of maintaining their permits in 
force. In the amendments of 2013, Parliament introduced Tier 1 and Tier 2 permits in an 
effort to separate projects that need careful consideration (Tier 1) and those that are simpler, 
eg ordinary quarries or alluvial gold workings (Tier 2). All petroleum operations are in Tier 1.  
 
Land Access 
 
The Act provides, in sections 47 to 89, for companies to be able to obtain access to the land 
where Crown minerals may be found. It is relatively easy to obtain access for minimum 
impact activities such as exploration using hand-held equipment. For other activities, an 
“access arrangement” is required. In the case of a dispute over access in the petroleum sector, 
companies can obtain an override of a land owner’s refusal to grant an access arrangement. In 
the non-petroleum sector, it is much more difficult, if not impossible, for a company to do so. 
Parallel procedures are in place for access to Crown land. They have been amended after the 
“Schedule Four” controversy of 2009 and 2010.  
 
Operations 
 
The CMA imposes certain controls on the activities of a company that holds a permit. (This is 
in addition to the controls imposed under other legislation, such as the RMA or the Health and 
Safety in Employment Act.) Conditions are imposed as part of the permit. The permit holder 
must provide NZPAM technical reports and annual reports of activity. The holder of a Tier 1 
permit must come to an annual review meeting with NZPAM, under section 33D. The 
purpose of the meeting is monitoring progress in the work programme and discussion with 
any regulatory agency that NZPAM invites to the meeting.) The Regulations under the Act 
impose further operational requirements. For non-petroleum minerals they are fairly general. 
However under the Crown Minerals (Petroleum) Regulations an operator is subject to a 
number of obligations to give notice of its intention to begin drilling a well, completing a 
well, well stimulation operations, and various other specified operations. However in most 
cases the control is relatively loose, as an obligation to give notice rather than an obligation to 
obtain consent. (This is contrast with the pattern of tighter petroleum regulation found in other 
countries such as Australia or Canada.) The amendments of 2013 make an effort to improve 
                                                          
4 Minerals Programme for Petroleum 2013, 7.0. 
5 Minerals Programme for Minerals (Excluding Petroleum) 2013, 6.0.  
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operational capacity, in requiring applicants for Tier 1 permits to satisfy the Minister that they 
have the capability and systems that are likely to be required to meet the health and safety and 
environmental requirements for the activities that they propose: section 29A(2). Sections 33A 
and 33B attempt to co-ordinate the CMA and the health and safety legislation better. (These 
amendments reflect efforts to improve regulation after the Pike River Mine disaster.) 
Generally, it is arguable that more work is needed to regulate the details of petroleum and 
other mineral operations efficiently and effectively.  
 
Finally, if minerals are produced from operations in a permit area, royalties are payable on the 
petroleum or other minerals extracted.  
 
Provisions in the CMA Specific to Māori 
 
A number of provisions of the CMA and its Regulations and programmes can be identified 
for relevance to Māori interests. (One should also note the signficant provisions of the RMA 
in relation to Māori; they can often be at least as important as those of the CMA. The EEZ 
Act provides for Māori interests but with a substantially different Treaty clause.)  
o CMA s 4 requires the Minister and all others exercising powers under it to have regard to 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi). Some of the principles that 
may be relevant here are a duty of the Crown to consult Māori (beyond ordinary duties to 
consider public submissions), a duty to ensure the protection of Māori interests in lands 
and resources, a duty to avoid prejudice to the redress of outstanding Treaty claims, and a 
general duty of partnership which requires both parties to act reasonably and in good faith.  
o The duty of consultation is made the subject of rules and procedures in the minerals 
programmes: Minerals Programme for Minerals (Excluding Petroleum) 2013 2.0; 
Minerals Programme for Petroleum 2013, 2.0. The Programmes specify when Minister or 
NZPAM will consult – on various applications for permits, on plans for a PEP Round. Iwi 
and hapū can ask for areas of land to be excluded from a permit, from an area available for 
alluvial gold mining, or from a PEP Round. Iwi and hapū are therefore consulted on most 
permit applications or the procedures that will lead to permit applications. Greenpeace of 
NZ Inc v Minister of Energy and Resources [2012] NZHC 1422 considered minerals 
programme provisions similar to the current ones. The Court found that the government 
had consulted extensively in developing the Minerals Programme and had offered to meet 
in advance of the block offer of 2008, and held that Te Whanau-a-Apanui had been 
offered ample opportunity to be consulted and heard on its concerns for its taonga. [136], 
and that the Crown had not breached its Treaty obligations. [140] 
o Crown Minerals Protocols have been made between NZPAM and different iwi and hapū 
under various deeds of settlement: Minerals Programme for Minerals (Excluding 
Petroleum) 2013 2.11 and Sched 2; Minerals Programme for Petroleum 2013, 2.9 and 
Sched 1. 
o A number of areas of land have been identified as being of particular significance for the 
mana of iwi and cannot be included in permits: CMA s 14(2)(c); Minerals Programme for 
Minerals (Excluding Petroleum) 2013, Sched 3; Minerals Programme for Petroleum 2013 
3.1.  
o The holder of a Tier 1 permit must report annually to NZPAM on its engagement with iwi 
or hapū whose rohe includes the permit or are otherwise affected by the permit: section 
33C. (Regulations may require the same of Tier 2 permittees, but do not so require at 
present.)  
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o Land access protections for Māori land noted above: section 51, 66. 
 
Waitangi Tribunal Determinations  
 
The Waitangi Tribunal has made several reports on minerals. The Petroleum Report (Wai 
796, 2003), noted above, analyzed the Petroleum Act 1937 which declared that all petroleum 
is vested in the Crown. The government did not accept the Tribunal’s argument for what it 
called a “Treaty interest” arising from the expropriation. The Report on the Management of 
the Petroleum Resource (Wai 796, 2011) found a number of systemic flaws in the present 
regime that caused Māori interests to be minimized. Advisory committees, full protection for 
Māori land, and a requirement to act in accordance with the principles of the Treaty, are 
examples of the changes that the Report recommended. Another relevant Report, concerning 
goldfields and mineral development, is the Hauraki Report (Wai 686, 2006).  
 
 
Canadian Comparisons 
 
There are striking comparisons to be made between New Zealand and Canada. Indigenous 
people in Canada have considerable experience of dealing with petroleum and mineral 
activity on a large scale. Some indigenous peoples have done well out of oil and gas on their 
reserves, or have bargained effectively for good-quality “impact and benefit agreements” for 
their communities. Under modern land claim settlement agreements, some indigenous people 
have obtained significant mineral assets and significant regulatory authority over resource 
development.6 Recently, the Tsilhqot’in First Nation of British Columbia won an important 
victory in obtaining rejection of Taseko Mines Ltd’s proposed New Prosperity Mine, saving a 
lake of great significance to them. Responsible members of the mineral industry are putting a 
great deal of effort into better relationships with aboriginal communities.7 All too often, 
however, first nations have paid a high price for the effect of mining and oil and gas activities 
on their traditional lands. At present, First Nations are strenuous in their opposition to the 
Northern Gateway pipeline project that would move petroleum from the Athabasca oil sands 
to a Pacific sea port at Kitimat.  
 
Key legal concepts such aboriginal title are shared by the New Zealand and Canadian legal 
systems. Most recently a First Nation, the Tsilhqot’in again as it happens, scored a historic 
victory with the first substantive affirmation of aboriginal title to a tract of land.8 The 
Supreme Court of Canada has also recently affirmed the duty of a provincial governments to 
take care of harvesting and other treaty rights in treaty areas.9 However, it is important to see 
that such treaties in Canada were different from the Treaty of Waitangi; most Canadian 
treaties were surrenders of aboriginal title in exchange for modest benefits. What is significant 
in Canada is the recognition and affirmation in the Constitution of the existing aboriginal and 
                                                          
6 For example, legislation enacted pursuant to the Nunavut Land Claim Settlement Agreement: Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement Act, SC 1993 c 29. Nunavut Tunngavik Inc holds title to minerals in 38,000 km2 and makes 
its own decisions about the allocation of rights to them: www.ntilands.com/minerals.  
7 For example, in the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, 
http://www.pdac.ca/programs/aboriginal-affairs. 
8 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44. 
9 Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48. 
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treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.10 Legal decisions, especially Delgamuukw v 
British Columbia11 and Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests),12 have 
confirmed that the protected rights include minerals, and are found in land covered by 
surrenders of aboriginal title as well as land not so affected. The courts have decided that this 
protection includes a duty of consultation, so the result is similar to one of New Zealand’s 
Treaty principles though by a different legal route. Haida Nation held that the Crown must 
engage in consultation where proposed Crown conduct could adversely affect claims to 
Aboriginal interests in land, with a view to accommodating, where appropriate, claimed 
interests before authorizing any activities that may adversely affect those interests. The nature 
of the consultation required would vary with the strength of the aboriginal claim and the 
potential for adverse effect. Ross River Dena Council v Government of Yukon13 has held that 
free entry, characteristic of many of Canada’s mining laws, is incompatible with the duty to 
consult. Free entry, coming down from the days of the gold rushes, allows an explorationist to 
enter land and stake his or her mineral claim by his or her own actions, only later reporting the 
acquisition to the government recorder. (New Zealand lost this characteristic years ago, in 
favour of the present system of discretionary allocation of rights by a minister.) The mining 
legislation of many provinces and territories in Canada will need to be amended if not 
rewritten.  
 
Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation,14 touched on above, sought to 
follow Haida Nation in relation to hard-rock mineral exploration in Northern Ontario. The 
Judge initially issued an interim injunction against exploration, and tried to bring about 
effective consultation, but without success. Six leaders of the First Nation then spent six 
months in jail for defying a court order to stop obstructing the exploration program; a high 
price to pay to protect one’s homeland. Striking in the long and bitter dispute was any sign of 
activity from the federal or provincial governments, which had primary responsibility for the 
honour of the Crown and the duty to consult. It is deplorable that the First Nation and the 
company were left to slug it out on their own. The lands were eventually reserved from 
mining, and the company sued the government for creating the proble. It accepted $5 million 
in settlement, glad no longer to be a litigation company. Since Platinex, and probably because 
of it, the Ontario legislature has made far reaching changes to the province’s Mining Act.15 
Aboriginal rights and consultation were the focus of a new purpose clause, a mandatory 
prospector’s awareness program, withdrawal of sites of aboriginal cultural significance from 
mineral activity, and a new scheme of exploration plans and permits that claim holders must 
obtain. In addition, a new statute, the Far North Act16 creates an entirely new system of 
statutory planning for the public lands of northern Ontario. It sets aside one of the largest 
protected areas in the world, and produces a land use planning system that brings in 
considerable First Nations participation. A joint planning body and community based land use 
plans are profided for, seeking a partnership on an equal basis between the government and 
                                                          
10 Constitution Act 1982 ss 25 & 35. The treaties in question are not like the Treaty of Waitangi, but were mostly 
surrenders of aboriginal title to land in exchange for reserves, for hunting, trapping and fishing rights, and other 
modest recompense.  
11 [1997] 3 SCR 1010, (1997) 153 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC). 
12 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511. 
13 2012 YKCA 14. 
14 Ont SCJ, 1 May 2007, 2007 CanLII 16637 (ONSC). 
15 SO 2009 c 21, amending the Mining Act RSO 1990 c M.14.  
16 SO 2010 c 18.  
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First Nations. However the aboriginal position, expressed by the Nishnawbe Aski Nation, has 
been one of strong opposition, because the Act was unilaterally imposed and because it 
required 50% of Nishnawbe Aski homelands to be permanently “parked.” In addition, First 
Nations do not acquire any special development rights to the off-reserve territory left over 
after the parks.  
 
It is obvious that there are numerous useful points of comparison between New Zealand and 
Canada about different approaches to the problems raised by mining and oil and gas projects, 
recognizing, of course, the unique circumstances of every project and every community. 
Because of Canada’s size and diversity, there is a rich array of experiences from which to 
draw useful insights.  
 
 
